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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the seminal paper that this symposium celebrates, A Team Pro-
duction Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout made 
two related points.1 The first one is a straightforward and fairly modest 
claim: Delaware law does not require shareholder primacy in public cor-
porations.2 Rather, the broad deference afforded to the decisions of pre-
dominantly independent corporate boards of directors is consistent with a 
contrary theory, that of team production, or, as they call it, “the mediat-
ing hierarch” theory.3 The fundamental role of the board of directors is to 
mediate between the interests of various stakeholders that contribute to 
the corporation’s output. As a result, Delaware courts have repeatedly 
authorized board decisions that further the interests of stakeholders at the 
expense of shareholders’ short-term interests, so long as directors are 
pursuing the long-term interests of the corporation. 
Blair and Stout’s second claim is normative: that such an arrange-
ment is more efficient than narrow shareholder primacy.4 Board deci-
sions are protected by the business judgment rule, which allows and ena-
bles the board, without risk of liability, to further the interests of stake-
holders because that increases overall social welfare. In their subsequent 
writing, Blair and Stout have focused on the normative question and 
stressed that whether their mediating hierarch model is more efficient 
than shareholder primacy can only be answered empirically.5 They have 
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 1. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 289 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production]. 
 2. See id. at 290–91. 
 3. See id. at 291–92. 
 4. See id. at 292. 
 5. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating 
Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403 (2001); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad 
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1201 (2002) (concluding that the 
question of whether director primacy or shareholder primacy is more efficient “cannot be answered 
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since assembled a solid amount of empirical evidence in support of their 
theory. 
Blair and Stout’s positive and normative assessments that team 
production is a better fit with Delaware corporate law, and likely more 
efficient, are convincing. In my brief contribution, I will draw on a close-
ly related area of law—securities regulation—to make two related points. 
First, unlike corporate law, and as a positive matter, securities regulation 
can be described as requiring shareholder primacy, or at least investor 
primacy. This is important because securities compliance takes up more 
of directors’ and officers’ time than compliance with corporate law, and 
thus likely influences and informs their day-to-day decisionmaking to a 
greater degree than does corporate law. If so, perhaps the persistent dom-
inance of shareholder primacy in corporate governance should not be 
surprising. Second, as a normative matter, investor primacy in securities 
regulation and enforcement may produce efficient results for most secu-
rities activities, but produces suboptimal compliance and enforcement for 
the most heavily litigated and debated category of securities misconduct: 
accounting fraud. Empirical evidence on the economic consequences of 
fraudulent financial reporting suggests that the exclusive focus on share-
holders is misplaced. I discuss these observations in turn in Parts II and 
III of this Essay, and suggest some implications. 
II. INVESTOR PRIMACY IN SECURITIES LAWS: A POSITIVE ACCOUNT 
Despite Blair and Stout’s, and others’, efforts to dethrone share-
holder primacy from dominating academic and policy debates about cor-
porate governance and regulation, it continues to reign supreme. Profes-
sor Stout has advanced three reasons for the persistent dominance of 
shareholder primacy: misleading metaphors describing shareholders as 
“owners,” activist shareholder opportunism, and accounting scandals.6 I 
would like to add a fourth reason: the rising importance of securities reg-
ulation—a closely related area of law and economic activity—where the 
law does appear to require investor primacy. 
                                                                                                                            
except on the basis of empirical evidence” (emphasis added)); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits 
of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 798–803 (2007) [hereinafter Stout, Mythical Benefits] 
(concluding that evidence favoring shareholder governance is “weak” and evidence favoring board 
control is “strong”); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why 
Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 692 (2003) 
(“[T]he longstanding debate between proponents of the monitoring model of the board and propo-
nents of the mediating model is an empirical argument that can only be resolved satisfactorily by 
empirical inquiry.” (emphasis added)). 
 6. See Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 5, at 803–07. 
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The twin goals of securities regulation are to protect investors and 
further the public interest, which have been understood relatively nar-
rowly as relating to capital market efficiency and competition.7 When the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates, section 106 of the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 requires the SEC 
to consider investor protection and the impact of proposed regulations on 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.8 Although its governing 
statutes afford the SEC some flexibility to consider both overall social 
welfare and the impact of proposed rules on overall efficiency, the SEC 
has limited its cost-benefit assessments by comparing the out-of-pocket 
cost of compliance for firms with benefits accruing to investors.9 Indeed, 
the D.C. Circuit, reviewing the SEC’s proxy-access rule, has suggested 
that the SEC should limit its analysis to “maximizing shareholder value” 
and ignore the economic consequences on employees, retirees, and local 
governments, even in their capacity as investors.10 
Moreover, when the SEC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) en-
force securities laws, they do so with investor protection in mind.11 In-
vestors, (which, to be fair, includes bondholders) are the only group enti-
tled to remedies under the securities laws.12 Only purchasers and sellers 
of securities have standing to bring a lawsuit for damages caused by se-
curities violations, and only they are entitled to compensation from the 
SEC’s and DOJ’s compensation funds.13 
                                                        
 7. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018, at 1 
(2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018-draft.pdf. 
 8. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 
(1996), codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f) (2010), 78w(a)(2) (2011), 80a-2(c) (2010). 
 9. See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare 
or Total Surplus, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 12) (describing Circular A-4 
which provides guidance for economic analysis of SEC rulemaking). 
 10. See Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d. 1144, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 11. See, e.g., Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial 
Penalties, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm 
(focusing almost exclusively on injured shareholders when discussing the appropriateness of corpo-
rate penalties). 
 12. One exception may be Section 16(b) liability for short-term swing profits by corporate 
insiders, where disgorgement is paid to the corporation, not to individual investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 
78p(b) (2014). 
 13. See generally Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the 
SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). For example, it is well under-
stood that bribery and corruption do not harm shareholders of the bribing firm. To the contrary, 
shareholders are the indirect beneficiaries of corrupt payments. Those harmed in the first order in-
clude rival businesses that are excluded from competition and consumers who have no choice but to 
buy inferior or pricier products, and in the second order various stakeholders who are indirectly 
harmed by distorted competition. The SEC and DOJ have extracted very large settlements in FCPA 
 
728 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:725 
To a large extent, the exclusive focus on investors in securities laws 
makes perfect economic sense. Although section 2 of the Securities Ex-
change Act lists, as one of four reasons justifying the need for securities 
regulation, the impact of capital market dislocations on “general wel-
fare”—specifically on employment, trade, transportation, and indus-
try14—many securities violations affect investors primarily, if not exclu-
sively.15 When investment banks fix interest rates paid to municipalities 
for reinvesting their bond proceeds, municipalities are hurt in their ca-
pacity as investors, not as local governments.16 When brokers embezzle 
funds from their customers’ accounts, 17  charge undisclosed commis-
sions, 18  or cherry-pick by allocating cheaply bought securities to the 
firm’s own account and more expensive ones to customers’ accounts,19 
their investor-customers bear the cost of the misconduct. Meanwhile, 
individual brokers and their firms benefit. Competition among broker-
dealers may be distorted as a result of such misconduct, but the economic 
costs of such distortions—beyond the losses to brokers’ customers—are 
generally relatively small.20 
More to the point, most investment vehicles fit the underlying as-
sumptions of shareholder primacy—that the firm is a nexus of contracts 
and that shareholders are the residual claimants—more closely than pub-
lic corporations. Blair and Stout start their article with a statement of the 
shareholder primacy view: “[P]ublic corporations are little more than 
bundles of assets collectively owned by shareholders (principals) who 
hire directors and officers (agents) to manage those assets on their be-
                                                                                                                            
enforcement actions, but because investors in those companies were not obviously harmed, the col-
lected funds were paid to the U.S. Treasury, not to the victims. See id. at 27. 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010). 
 15. See Velikonja, supra note 13, at 45–51. 
 16. See, e.g., Complaint at 5–6, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 11-cv-
7135 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2011). 
 17. See, e.g., Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., Initial Dec. Rel. No. 296, Admin. Proc. File 3–
11692, at 52 (Sept. 15, 2005) (finding that Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., a broker–dealer 
and investment advisory firm, allowed its broker to embezzle $16.4 million from clients by failing to 
take adequate steps despite multiple red flags). 
 18. See, e.g., Franklin Advisers, Inc. & Franklin/Templeton Distrib., Inc., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 50841 (Dec. 13, 2004) (finding that Franklin Templeton Investments, a mutual fund in-
vestment complex, used $52 million of fund assets to compensate broker–dealers for marketing 
those funds). 
 19. See, e.g., Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. K.W. Brown & Co., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1275 
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 21. 2005) (No. 05-cv-80367-CIV). 
 20. For example, Lehman Brothers allegedly pressured its research analysts to issue falsely 
optimistic reports about firms, on the hopes that Lehman Brothers would secure their investment 
banking business. The federal district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the class action 
because Lehman’s conduct caused no harm. See Memorandum & Order at 8–9, Swack v. Lehman 
Bros., 1:03-cv-10907-NMG (D. Mass. Aug. 17, 2005) (No. 39). 
2015] Team Production and Securities Laws 729 
half.”21 While the shareholder primacy model does not describe public 
corporations, it is a fairly accurate abstraction for another type of entity: 
an investment fund. 
An investment fund is little more than a contract between two par-
ties: fund investors and a management company (often called an invest-
ment adviser) that agrees to manage assets of fund investors in exchange 
for a fee.22 The fund is a legal entity distinct from the management com-
pany. The fund has no employees, no office space, no leases, and no op-
erational assets. Under the terms of the contract, the management com-
pany agrees to supply all of the operational and administrative services 
the fund requires.23 In exchange for management services, fund custom-
ers pay the manager set fees, which are usually part fixed and part based 
on the manager’s performance, measured by increase in the value of as-
sets. The contract between the customers (principals) and the manager 
(agent) is comprehensive and complete in the sense that the agent cannot 
collect fees in excess of those specified in the contract. 
The fund structure thus fits fairly closely with the nexus-of-
contracts and residual claimant theories of the firm. The contract be-
tween the management firm and fund investors separates the two and 
ensures that fund investors are the only residual owners of the fund. This 
is so because any stakeholders necessary to manage the fund have con-
tacts only with the management company.24 When managers steal from 
the fund, it is the fund’s customers who are directly harmed and have a 
right to sue the manager who benefited from the misconduct—not the 
fund—for compensation. Since the fund has no other stakeholders, only 
fund investors are harmed. 
But securities laws do not govern just investment funds. They apply 
to operating companies where many different stakeholder groups con-
tribute to the output of the company in ways that are not easily observa-
ble or measurable and make firm-specific investments. Where Delaware 
corporate law defers to the board of directors to mediate among the dif-
ferent groups and limit rent-seeking, securities laws do not. 
The disparity between Delaware corporate law and securities law 
can be illustrated by drawing on one of the examples that Blair and Stout 
                                                        
 21. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 1, at 248. 
 22. See generally John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Invest-
ment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1238–39 (2014). 
 23. Id. at 1238–39. 
 24. The number of stakeholders is small relative to public corporations. Recently, the Wall 
Street Journal ran a story about David Abrams, a hedge fund manager, who with a very limited staff 
manages $8 billion for his customers. See Rob Copeland, Hedge Fund World’s One-Man Wealth 
Machine, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2014, at C1. 
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use: private litigation. Blair and Stout describe the shareholder derivative 
suit and its various procedural aspects in support of the model of the 
board as a mediating hierarch.25 At first blush, a derivative suit appears 
to be a shareholder remedy: shareholder plaintiffs sue the board of direc-
tors for violating their fiduciary duties of loyalty, by self-dealing,26 or of 
care, by failing to further the interests of the company in bad faith or not 
on an informed basis.27 But, on closer inspection, the remedy is con-
sistent with team production. First, shareholders seeking to sue deriva-
tively must first demand that the firm’s board take legal action.28 The 
board can decline to do so, and its decision is subject to the deferential 
business judgment rule. Demand may be excused when the board has 
obvious and substantial conflicts of interest, but an independent commit-
tee without such disabilities can terminate or take control of derivative 
litigation that shareholders already initiated.29 Second, if the suit is suc-
cessful, damages are paid to the corporation, not to the plaintiff share-
holders.30 As Blair and Stout explain, if “shareholders could be the direct 
recipients of damages payments in derivative cases, . . . [s]hareholders as 
a group would become wealthier at the expense of the corporate entity. 
This sort of wealth transfer usually harms creditors, employees, and other 
stakeholders in the corporation.”31 And third, in some limited circum-
stances, unsecured creditors have a right to bring a derivative action 
when shareholders have been wiped out.32 
Securities litigation is often compared to derivative litigation and 
described as its substitute.33 But unlike a derivative suit, a typical securi-
ties class action under rule 10b-534 (or, for that matter, under sections 11 
and 12 of the Securities Act) can be filed without the intermediation of 
the board of directors, regardless of the board’s independence and over 
the board’s direct objection.35 While the plaintiff must plead scienter and 
                                                        
 25. See Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 1, at 288. 
 26. See id. at 298. 
 27. See id. at 299–301. 
 28. See id. at 294. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 295. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Govern-
ance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 904 (2003) (noting that securities litiga-
tion, instead of derivative litigation, is commonly used to litigate fiduciary duty claims). 
 34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
 35. One exception under securities laws is Section 16(b) litigation for short-term swing profits 
by corporate insiders. Damages are paid to the corporation and not to the shareholder plaintiffs. See 
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2014). 
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a host of other things in order to avoid dismissal of the suit,36 a class ac-
tion under securities law is a direct class action suit by defrauded share-
holders for compensation, thereby removing the decision to dismiss the 
action from the corporate board’s hands. 
Another distinction is that damages in class actions are paid to the 
plaintiffs, not the corporation. Securities class action damage payments 
are frequently described as circular wealth transfers by shareholders to 
themselves, “shifting money from one pocket to another, minus the high 
transaction costs of securities litigation.”37 While circularity may be a 
legitimate concern, that payment of damages38 also drains cash from the 
corporation, often at a time that it needs it most, and transfers wealth to 
shareholders at the expense of corporate stakeholders. Finally, except for 
a handful of bankruptcy cases, in reality, only equity investors can bring 
a class action for fraud.39 
These differences between derivative and securities litigation are 
important because securities litigation by far surpasses derivative litiga-
tion, both by the number of lawsuits filed and certainly by settlement 
dollars.40 And not just in the world of private litigation; with the rise of 
capital markets over the last three decades, securities laws have gained 
influence over the regulation of public corporations, and with it, over the 
theory of public corporate governance.41 This is an unfortunate and inef-
ficient result, in particular when it comes to the most heavily litigated 
and debated category of securities violation: accounting fraud.42 
                                                        
 36. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2010). 
 37. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1558 (2006). 
 38. Most public firms purchase Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance. A large majority of 
cases settle within the insurance policy’s limits, and so the D&O insurance covers the entire class 
action settlement. But the corporation pays D&O premia with corporate funds. Either way, share-
holders fund the cost of class action settlements. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Cor-
porate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 497–98 & n.3 (2007). 
 39. See James J. Park, Bondholders and Securities Class Actions, 99 MINN. L. REV. (2014) 
(forthcoming) (describing class actions by bondholders and noting that they are limited to large 
bankruptcy cases where the firm issued a lot of public debt shortly before bankruptcy). 
 40. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 38, at 497 n.39 (quoting interviews with D&O insurance 
in support). 
 41. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.); Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1779 (2011); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
 42. More than 60% of class action settlements and more than 90% of all damages paid in class 
actions are for accounting fraud. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, ACCOUNTING CLASS ACTION 
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III. THE CASE OF FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD 
As a positive matter, shareholder primacy accurately captures the 
underlying premise of securities regulation. As a normative matter, how-
ever, our securities enforcement and compensation schemes would be 
more efficient if they took into account the team production model where 
it is applicable and most relevant: in accounting fraud cases. 
A. A Normative Critique 
Accounting fraud is commonly described as a transfer of wealth to 
managers from the firm’s shareholders. Under the nexus-of-contracts 
theory, the firm is described as a team of inputs organized under a net of 
related contractual arrangements. The contracts require the firm to pay 
claimants fixed amounts, except for shareholders, whose claims are vari-
able and depend on the residual value of the enterprise: the firm’s prof-
its.43 The value of an investment in stock depends entirely on the esti-
mates of profits the firm might generate in the future. Insiders, usually 
managers, can manipulate these estimates by releasing false but credible 
information. Fraudulent disclosures inflate the stock price, while eventu-
al exposure of fraud returns the price to the correct level reflecting fun-
damentals, which is what the price would have been absent fraud. Sellers 
win, buyers lose, and those who hold on are unaffected by fraud.44 
Under the nexus-of-contracts theory, fixed claimants are unaffected 
by false disclosures and securities fraud because their claims are, by def-
inition, fixed by contract.45 But this is only true if their claims are well 
defined, if fixed claimants are compensated fully for firm-specific in-
vestments, if switching between jobs or clients is frictionless and cost-
less, and if association with fraud has no reputational effects on payoffs 
from future contracts.46 
These assumptions do not describe labor markets or most supplier 
markets. Compensation for firm-specific investments is usually deferred, 
at least in part. Labor and supplier markets are far less homogenous than 
                                                                                                                            
FILINGS AND SETTLEMENTS: 2011 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1, 11–12 (2012), available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2011/accounting-class-action-filings-and-
settlements-2011.pdf. 
 43. See Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal 
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 180. 
 44. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 635 (1985). 
 45. Less doctrinaire theorists have relaxed the no-loss assumption by fixed claimants, but assert 
that contractual solutions are preferable to regulation. See Macey, supra note 43, at 174. 
 46. Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1915–16 
(2013) [hereinafter Velikonja, Cost of Fraud]. 
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markets for capital, and finding substitute employment or customers 
takes time. Without accurate information about the firm’s prospects, em-
ployees and suppliers will underestimate the likelihood of firm failure 
and over-rely. To add salt to the wound, if fraud is unmasked, the fraud 
firm often unravels quickly. The revelation of accounting fraud thus both 
increases the likelihood of termination and extends the period of unem-
ployment (assuming all else is equal).47 Finally, unlike shareholders, em-
ployees (and to a lesser extent suppliers) cannot self-insure against the 
risk of fraud, like shareholders can, by diversifying. 
Moreover, it is important to distinguish primary market and sec-
ondary market accounting frauds. When the firm is offering securities to 
investors on the basis of false disclosures, investors overpay for securi-
ties and the firm receives the inflated payments. Unless managers (or 
promoters) immediately pay themselves a bonus or simply steal the mon-
ey, the firm’s stakeholders likely benefit from additional capital. While 
the misrepresentation will also distort stakeholders’ economic 
decisionmaking and inflict additional losses if it is revealed, in many 
cases the benefit may exceed the cost. But in the vast majority of ac-
counting fraud cases, where the firm does not directly benefit from the 
misrepresentation, or where the direct benefit is small, the losses to 
stakeholders will outweigh any benefits for the reasons described below. 
One form of accounting fraud occurs when mangers release false 
disclosures to disguise disappointing performance and buy themselves 
time to right the course.48 False financial statement disclosures are dis-
seminated publicly, not only to the firm’s shareholders. A misrepresenta-
tion communicates to those who contract with the firm that the firm’s 
financial health is better than it really is, that the firm presents a low 
credit risk, and that the firm is less likely to terminate employees for 
business reasons. 49  Financial statement misrepresentations are usually 
accompanied by similarly misleading public pronouncements directed at 
the investment community and the firm’s stakeholders.50 While creditors 
have long relied on financial statements to price credit, employees and 
suppliers also rely on financial disclosures to assess the viability of the 
firm.51 In assessing viability, the firm’s risk of failure is considered, as 
                                                        
 47. See id. at 1918–23. 
 48. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Mar-
kets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 701–03 (1992). 
 49. Velikonja, Cost of Fraud, supra note 46, at 1911. 
 50. See id. at 1910. 
51. Sometimes suppliers and customers are aware of and assist the defendant firm commit ac-
counting fraud. Those entities are obviously not mislead by financial misrepresentations. See 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
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well as the expected payoff from explicit and implicit contracts with the 
firm. 
Second, to avoid detection, managers must change the firm’s real 
actions to match its reported financial health. Managers might sell output 
at a loss, announce new projects, overinvest in fixed assets, and 
overhire.52 To mask fraud, managers might choose projects with higher 
cash-flow volatility, known as “lottery tickets,” or projects whose returns 
are not correlated with existing investments.53 
Changes in investment, hiring, and product pricing interfere with 
economic learning by rivals and distort real economic decisions that mis-
reporting firms and their honest competitors make. Accounting fraud is 
procyclical and exacerbates boom and bust cycles.54 Until fraud is dis-
covered, the inflated stock price will continue to benefit managers as 
well as the firm’s current shareholders. The fraudulent firm can make 
cheap stock-for-stock acquisitions using its overpriced equity, negotiate 
better loan terms as a result of its perceived lower risk, and hire more 
talented workers, excited about the firm’s bright future.55 Shareholders 
and bondholders who sell the firm’s stock and debt in the secondary 
markets during fraud also benefit from fraud. 
Finally, if accounting fraud is discovered, the aftermath—
investigations, litigation, and enforcement actions—is very costly for the 
firm, its stakeholders, and the industry in which the firm operates. Share-
holder losses capture all of the attention, but they are a very crude meas-
ure of the losses caused. For example, for each shareholder who lost 
money, there is a shareholder who sold at an inflated price. The follow-
ing section develops the empirical evidence showing that the losses to 
stakeholders likely exceed the losses to shareholders. 
B. Some Evidence 
An earlier paper of mine assembles the empirical evidence on eco-
nomic consequences of financial statement fraud.56 In this Essay, I pro-
vide a summary of the most salient findings. 
Firm-level evidence beyond immediate stock-price declines is diffi-
cult to develop in the accounting fraud context. Several studies report 
                                                        
 52. Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product Markets: Theory 
and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom), 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439, 
439, 457–58 (2006). 
 53. See Velikonja, Cost of Fraud, supra note 46, at 1910. 
 54. See id. at 1908. 
 55. See id. at 1910–11. 
 56. Id. 
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increased cost of borrowing after a restatement, both by fraud firms and 
their rivals.57 In an oft-cited study, Simi Kedia and Thomas Philippon 
report that restating firms overhire and overinvest during the period of 
the misrepresentation and reduce both labor and investment thereafter. 
The subsequent decline in employment exceeds both the prior increase 
and the trends in the wider economy. While all nonfarm payrolls in-
creased by 6.7% between 1997 and 1999 and then declined by 1.5% from 
2000 to 2002, employment in restating firms increased by 500,000—
20%—and then fell by 600,000.58 Industries marred by restatements lost 
jobs permanently, even where rivals reclaimed the restating firms’ mar-
ket share.59 
Comparison studies between fraud firms and their rivals reveal the 
extent of the economic distortion from accounting fraud. Fraud firms 
report considerable negative abnormal returns upon discovery of fraud—
between 9% and 38%. But rival firms, too, report losses when their peers 
are caught manipulating their financial statements. The effect on each 
rival firm is small, around 0.5% according to various studies, but the ag-
gregate market capitalization losses of rival firms exceed losses to fraud 
firms by a considerable margin. In one reported case, the restating firm 
lost $141 million in market capitalization, while its rivals lost $581 mil-
lion.60 Rival losses are attributable to impaired economic learning, dis-
torted competition and contagion, and are considerably more pronounced 
in less competitive industries.61 
Less but not least, financial reporting of fraud is costly for all levels 
of government. Where the government relies on disclosures by public 
firms, false disclosures will distort government policy. Even where the 
effect is not direct, the losses and economic distortions from accounting 
fraud reduce the tax base and increase the demand for social spending.62 
C. Implications for Securities Regulation 
It is well understood that shareholders prefer more risk-taking to 
other constituents because they do not bear the full cost of risk-taking but 
capture the entire benefit. Risk-taking includes financial reporting of 
fraud. Shareholders, left to their own devices, will underinvest on com-
                                                        
 57. See id. at 1935–37. 
 58. Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2169, 2193, 2194 fig.3 (2009). 
 59. Id. at 2195, 2197. 
 60. See Art Durnev & Claudine Mangen, Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements, 
47 J. ACCT. RES. 679, 699 (2009). 
 61. See Velikonja, Cost of Fraud, supra note 46, at 1929–32. 
 62. See id. at 1937–38. 
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pliance and monitoring to reduce the risk of accounting fraud. This ob-
servation has several implications for securities regulation. 
First, the public interest should drive securities enforcement for ac-
counting fraud, not a concern with investor protection. Enron was bad for 
its shareholders, but it was worse for those working at the firm and doing 
business with it. A team production model would enrich our understand-
ing of why accounting fraud is so costly and improve enforcement. It 
would also provide a more compelling rationale for rigorous securities 
regulation enforcement in general, certainly better than the rationales of 
investor protection or shareholder harms. 
Specifically, because the economic losses from accounting fraud 
are large but difficult to measure, efforts should be directed at preventing 
accounting fraud through ex ante measures, not ex post liability. The 
SEC’s new automated detection program, which flags financial disclo-
sures that are correlated with accounting manipulation, is a step in the 
right direction.63 
Finally, the analysis suggests that private securities litigation under 
rule 10b-5 is not inefficient just because it moves money from share-
holders’ right pocket to the left one (minus legal fees), because it fails to 
deter fraudulent managers, or both. Rather, private securities litigation 
under rule 10b-5 is inefficient because it compensates shareholders who 
can, for the most part, cheaply and easily self-insure against the risk of 
accounting fraud. Further, it also fails to compensate nonshareholder 
constituencies who cannot easily diversify or contract around accounting 
fraud. Rather than compensating nonshareholders for losses they proba-
bly cannot prove with sufficient certainty, it might be more efficient to 
direct payments to the U.S. Treasury. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Securities regulation and enforcement focus exclusively on investor 
losses, both as a matter of positive law and underlying theory. While that 
focus may be appropriate for most securities misconduct, the analysis of 
economic consequences of financial reporting fraud suggests that the 
residual claimant model that underpins securities regulation is inappro-
priate for at least one class of violations. Accounting fraud should not be 
prohibited because of the losses to shareholders. It is terrible for the loss-
es it inflicts on nonshareholders. For these reasons, let us hope that A 
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Team Production Theory of Corporate Law will become one of the most 
heavily cited articles in securities regulation, just as it already is in cor-
porate law. 
